Ⅰ. Introduction
The “gray zone” conflict is the most common mode of ambiguous and hybrid warfare among modern states that seek to avoid war. A multitude of the provocations contrived and carried out by a country in a disadvantageous position to offset its relative weaknesses can be categorized as the gray zone conflict. The so-called revisionist countries such as Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea have been attracted to gray zone tactics to shake up the U.S.-led international order. In particular, China’s high-growth era and rise to a global economic power after reform and opening-up marked its turn outward in expanding international influence, and maximizing its national security interests by challenging U.S. hegemony or altering the status quo. However, China has yet to develop military capabilities to directly challenge American hegemony despite its remarkable rise on the global stage over the past decades. And this is presumably why China is pursuing the gray zone strategy engineered to alter the status quo in its favor without triggering direct backlash or militarized responses through indirect intervention. China initially formulated its gray zone strategy to leverage nonmilitary means against Taiwan, but Beijing now employs gray zone tactics across a wider range of domains: political, economic, and diplomatic. The gray zone strategy stems from the “Three Warfare,” the guiding conceptual framework created as the political maneuvering within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). To conceptually differentiate China’s gray zone strategy from its “Three Warfare,” the latter encompasses confrontation and conflict in peacetime whereas the former focuses on how to seize the advantage in political and military confrontations. However, seen from a broad perspective, the two concepts aim to alter the existing order and power dynamics and share a desire to act below the threshold of a militarized response.1)
1) Regarding the conceptual difference of gray zone strategy and three warfare, refer to Kim Jae Yeop, “China’s Three Warfare as a “Strategic Challenge Other Than War”: Characteristics, Cases, and their Implications for Security of the Korean Peninsula” NEW ASIA 29, no.1 (2022): 94-126. [in Korean] IP2023-02E |July 6 , 2023
With this perception in mind, this paper primarily aims to derive future-oriented implications and offer clear-eyed ways for Korea through a bird’s-eye view of China’s Gray Zone strategy based on the “Three Warfare,” by examining China’s assertive behaviors and strategies played out in Korea.
II. How the Concept of Gray Zone Has Evolved in China in the Post-Cold War Era
1.The End of the Cold War and the Development of the Gray Zone Conflict
After the end of the Cold War, the world witnessed the advent of a U.S.-centered world order based on American unipolarity, and countries that wanted to challenge it attempted to expand their influence through alternative activities to avoid full-on confrontation with the U.S. As is well known, China and Russia have stood at the forefront of carrying out the activities that fall into the murky in-between peace and war to achieve their political goals. These attempts went to some lengths to draw attention, but it was not until 2010 when the U.S.-China strategic competition got in full swing that intellectual and political circles began to define and develop the gray zone as a specific strategy. The term “gray zone” began to be used widely in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) by the U.S. Department of Defense and several documents issued by the Japanese government.2) Of course, there are other concepts invented to describe a set of ambiguous activities or threats in a murky area between war and peace such as the terms “Irregular Warfare (IW)” and “Hybrid Warfare.” Irregular warfare describes activities aimed at overthrowing the adversary’s regime through the indirect use of forces such as terrorism and insurgency. And the term “Hybrid Warfare” refers to activities that entail an interplay of conventional and nonconventional instruments - conventional weapons, terrorism, international legal disputes, cyber-attacks, disinformation campaigns, and election meddling, to achieve political goals. In a slightly different vein, the gray zone conflict, which is the focal point of this paper, focuses on defensive and offensive activities deliberately designed to remain below the threshold of aggressive use of military forces even after active hostilities take place for the purpose of undermining the target opponent’s security and peace. The Heritage Foundation’s annual Index of U.S. Military Strength 2016, conceptualizes gray zone conflicts and other relevant modes of conflicts by the intensity of violence in disputes.3)
2) Secretary of Defense, U.S., QDR 2010, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/defenseReviews/QDR/QDR_as_of_29JAN10_1600.pdfMinistryofDefense,Ja pan,2013DefenseProgramsandBudgetofJapan,https://www.mod.go.jp/en/d_act/d_budget/pdf/251009.pdf;Ministryof Defense,Japan,2020SecurityEnvironmentSurroundingJapan,https://www.mod.go.jp/en/publ/w_paper/wp2020/pdf/R02010100.pdf(allaccessedDecember20,2022).
3) Heritage Foundation, 2016 Index of U.S. Military, https://s3.amazonaws.com/ims-2016/PDF/2016_Index_of_US_Military_Strength_FULL.pdf(accessedMay30,2023)
To narrow the scope of analysis to Northeast Asia, regional players tend to exercise caution in the use of high-profile military tactics and have employed the gray zone strategy because they are aware of the region’s security landscape fraught with long-standing tensions. Since the beginning of the 21st century, China, with its rapid ascendency as the most powerful player in Northeast Asia, has endeavored to alter the status quo in the region by employing gray zone tactics toward or against its neighbors to maximize its core national interests that consist primarily of territorial integrity and sovereignty.
2. China’s Gray Zone Strategy
In China, the term “Three Warfare” is more commonly used. The Three Warfare means China’s intangible and indirect strategies based on the coordinated use of psychological warfare (心理战), public opinion warfare (舆论战), and legal warfare (法律战). The concept was based on Chapter 2 Article 14 No.18. of the December 2003 PLA Political Work Regulation (政治工作條例) issued by the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China (中國共産黨中央軍事委員會, CMC).4)
4) Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, 2003 PLA Political Work Regulation (Beijing: CCP CC, 2003), 1-42, https://www.doc88.com/p-3995910965784.html (accessed May 30, 2023). [in Chinese]
To elaborate, it is articulated that political operations in wartime include public opinion warfare, psychological warfare, and legal warfare . aimed at undermining the adversary’s morale and will to fight. This means that the concept of “strategic challenges posed below the threshold of armed conflicts” was fleshed out as a norm and integrated into China’s military doctrine. Around 1999, “Unrestricted Warfare (超限戰),” the concept created by Colonels Qiao Liang (乔良) and Wang Xiangsui (王湘穗), drew attention within the PLA. Its primary focus is how China can create a strategic environment unfavorable to the U.S., a militarily superior opponent, by resorting to a variety of alternative methods to circumvent the need for direct military confrontation.5) The two colonels underscored the need to wage multi-dimensional warfare by removing limits and breaking down boundaries between wartime and peacetime, the military and private sectors, the central government and government agencies, and military weapons and non-military methods – politics, education, businesses, and finance. The concept places primary emphasis on “the situation (形勢),” and unlike the Western concept that draws an arithmetical comparison of the two opponents’ military capabilities, China views the situation and conditions are in a state of flux. The concept proposes laying the groundwork for outmaneuvering the opponent at the most critical moment by closely observing its primary weaknesses and refining strategic toolkits in peacetime. To this end, it is advised to use media manipulation and influence operations designed to disturb society to the detriment of the opponent. Each of the key elements and methods of legal warfare, psychological warfare, and public opinion warfare constituting the “Three Warfare” can be summarized as follows. For starters, legal warfare refers to a preemptive action taken to secure political legitimacy domestically and diplomatic legitimacy externally for its current or future military activities using laws and norms.6) These attempts, if they make inroads into the domain of international law, could even restrict the opponent’s behavior.7)
China has exploited domestic and international laws to its strategic advantage. And in dealing with territorial disputes, Beijing takes bold steps to justify its position by amending relevant laws and the institutional framework.8) Even if China's claims run counter to international customs or the legal system, Beijing reiterates unilateral claims and asserts Chinese interests to carry its point and gain the legal high ground on the international stage. Secondly, psychological warfare seeks to cripple the opponent’s ability to conduct military operations by undermining the morale of its leadership and civilian population. According to Dean Cheng's analysis, psychological warfare includes three types of warfare: coercive psychological warfare, deceptive psychological warfare, and divisive psychological warfare.9)
5) Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare (Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, 1999). [in Chinese]
6) Lee Ji-hoon, “Modern Warfare’s “Legal warfare” and The Implication for ROK Armed Forces: Focus on the Chinese PLA Perspective” The Quarterly Journal of Defense Policy Studies 30, no.2 (2014) : 125-154. [in Korean]
7) Kim Sang-kul, “The Context and Concept of Lawfare as a Means of Hybrid Warfare” Ajou Law Review 15, no.1 (2021), 105-135. [in Korean]
8) Jeong Ho-seop, “The Background and Significance of the Implementation of China’s Maritime Safety Law,” KIMS Periscope, no.248 (2021), https://kims.or.kr/issubrief/kims-periscope/peri248 (accessed May 31, 2023). [in Korean]
9) Dean Cheng, “Winning Without Fighting: The Chinese Psychological Warfare Challenge,” Global Politics, (2013), https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/report/winning-without-fighting-the-chinese-psychological-warfare-challen ge (accessed May 31, 2023).
Thirdly, public opinion warfare, which is generally waged in parallel with psychological warfare, is aimed at influencing public opinion directly and indirectly, and even launching overt disinformation campaigns to incapacitate the opponent. In many cases, the target adversary’s media outlets are used, and as information can be accessed and disseminated easily online, the Internet has been used as the main channel of public opinion warfare recently. In waging public opinion warfare, a state aims to galvanize domestic support for political and military measures against the enemy, sway the perceptions of foreign audiences in neutral countries in its favor, and disintegrate the target country’s society and public morale, by assertively employing a variety of military measures and channels of information dissemination.
These three types of warfare are characterized by premeditated and deliberate attempts to directly interfere with and shape human perception and psychology without drawing arbitrary lines between peacetime and wartime. The “Three Warfare” shares similarities with hybrid warfare in terms of operability in that they rely on cutting-edge technology including information technology and other advanced tools and platforms. And of the three modes of warfare, legal warfare stands out as a distinctive feature of China’s gray zone strategy compared to other countries’ gray zone strategies that entail intangible and abstract elements such as psychological warfare. According to Michael J. Mazarr, former Professor at the U.S. National War College, the gray zone operation strategies can be implemented by selecting, combining, or sequencing the following six elements based on situational perception: (ⅰ) narrative wars; (ⅱ) denial of prosperity; (ⅲ) civilian intervention; (ⅳ) active infiltration; (ⅴ) coercive signaling; and (ⅵ) proxy disruption.10)
10) Michael J. Mazarr, Mastering the Gray Zone: Understanding a Changing Era of Conflict (U.S. Army War College Press, 2015), 81, https://press.armywarcollege.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1427&context=monographs (accessed May 20, 2023).
China’s claims over the South China Sea based on the nine-dash line and the Northeast Project of the CASS exemplify its narrative wars in the region. And examples of denial of prosperity include a series of punitive economic and trade measures in diplomatic scuffles and control of outbound Chinese tourists since 2000. And examples of civilian intervention include Chinese attempts to make Taiwan bog down in diplomatic isolation by compelling countries to sever diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Examples of active infiltration include the provision of sponsorship for politicians in democratic countries and manipulation of public opinion in other countries through state-sponsored disinformation campaigns led by Internet commentators such as the 50 Cent Party, or “wumao,” who are reportedly paid by Chinese authorities. China’s response to U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan - dispatching warships and military aircraft in the Taiwan Strait exemplifies coercive signaling. China’s well-known “cabbage tactics” can be seen as a fusion of civilian intervention and coercive signaling, and creating artificial islands could be categorized as coercive signaling. Proxy disruption has not occurred between Korea and China so far, but the future activities of the Maritime Militia deserve attention because it is forecast that they will be the primary agents of China’s proxy war tactics in the coming years.
III. Regional Applications and Implications: Friction between Seoul and Beijing over THAAD Deployment
1. Background
The ROK-China relationship has long been complicated by a wide spectrum of historical opportunities and challenges. Before the establishment of diplomatic relations, China had perceived Korea as one of the major security threats undermining its core national interests and objectives. However, faced with the rapidly shifting global political landscape, China came to accept U.S. military presence in South Korea and even acknowledge that the ROK-U.S. alliance will unlikely pose military threats although it might pose political threats to China. This is mainly because Beijing’s threat perception of the U.S. and ROK-U.S. alliance in the 1980s was mitigated with the normalization of the U.S.-China relations. Since then, Seoul and Beijing have forged and advanced their relations based on a mutual understanding of their situations and positions in the contemporary security environment. But on July 8, 2016, the Korean government’s official announcement to deploy THAAD changed Beijing’s perception. Looking at the timeline, the media began to report on the U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral missile defense system in 2014, and the Korean government issued a statement that it is neither considering the THAAD deployment nor discussing it with Washington. But the Korean government acknowledged that it is aware that the THAAD deployments could help defend South Korean citizens from North Korean nuclear and missile threats, and stated that the government is not against the deployment in case U.S. forces in Korea are willing to pay the costs.11) However, on February 7, 2016, the Korean government changed its stance and announced to negotiate the THAAD deployment with the U.S. government, which was Seoul’s response to Pyongyang’s fourth nuclear test on January 6, 2016, and the launch of the “Kwangmyongsong-4” on February 7. After North Korea’s fourth nuclear test, then President Park Geun-hye announced that “the THAAD deployments will be considered to advance our security and national interests” and the South Korean government officially expressed that it was “considering the THAAD deployment” shortly after the rocket launch. These developments show that the South Korean government’s decision gradually changed over time with Pyongyang’s provocations. However, China viewed the THAAD deployment as security threats, not as an effort to protect South Korea from North Korean nuclear and missile threats. The rationale behind such perception was that THAAD is just an expansion of the U.S. missile defense system and influence in East Asia. The Chinese Foreign Minister expressed strong dissatisfaction with the South Korean Foreign Minister at the Munich Security Conference,12) and the Chinese Foreign Ministry issued the spokesperson’s remarks lashing out at Seoul’s decision to deploy THAAD.13) The Chinese government summoned the ROK ambassador to China twice in July 2016 and August 2017 to express strong dissatisfaction and firm opposition. In March of that year, President Xi Jinping reiterated his firm opposition to the THAAD deployment in Korea.14)
11) Press Briefings on 5 and 14 in February 2015 by the Spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea ,
12) “王毅會見韓國外長：“薩德”危害中方戰略安全利益,” 『中國新聞網, 12 February 2016 (accessed on 6 April 2021).
13) “美韓宣布部署薩德系統 中國表示強烈不滿和堅決反對,” 『人民日報』, 9 Julu 2016. [in Chinese]
14) “習近平會見奧巴馬：美國在韓國部署薩德“損人不利己,” 『新華社』, 2016. 4. 1. (accessed on 6 April 2021).
Beijing also implemented unofficial retaliatory economic, social, and cultural measures against Seoul. With a growing antipathy between the two countries, negative public views toward China in Korea and anti-Korea sentiment in China have deepened over the past years. Against this backdrop, the following paragraphs examine the cases of China’s Three Warfare - psychological warfare, public opinion warfare, and legal warfare played out in Korea.
2. Public Opinion Warfare
Since the THAAD deployment, what’s most striking is that China has scaled up efforts at rallying its population, especially Internet users, for public opinion warfare. The surge of Chinese patriotism under Xi Jinping’s leadership, which projects domestic political objectives into its foreign policy, combined with the Chinese youth with strong national pride and Internet literacy received an enthusiastic response. The Chinese Foreign Ministry’s high-level officials including the Chinese ambassador to Korea consistently led public opinion against the THAAD deployment in South Korea.15) And Chinese media outlets such as the People’s Daily (人民日報) and Global Times (環球時報) backed such efforts. On February 5, 2016, right before the Park Geun-hye administration changed its stance on the THAAD deployment, President Xi reportedly called President Park to discuss North Korea’s missile test and imposition of sanctions against Pyongyang, and spoke with President Barack Obama on the same issue.16)
15) Chinese Ambassador to ROK Qiu Guohong’s Comment, “THAAD deployment Will Deteriorate ROK-China Relations,” 『The Kyunghyang Shinmun』, 26 November 2014, . [in Korean]
16) President Part Geun-hye’s Call for Xi’s Support, 『Pressian』, 5 February 2016 .
However, the Chinese media did not report their calls, and the Chinese public came to believe that South Korea unilaterally changed its position without prior consultation with neighboring countries including China and vehemently criticized the South Korean government. With Beijing not commenting on this, anti-Korean sentiment and oppositionto the THAAD deployment in China intensified. Beijing simultaneously tried to ignite the Korean public’s opposition to the THAAD deployment, spreading the claims of scholars, politicians, and high-profile figures who share opposition to THAAD.17)
17) “Deeply disappointed by the Minjoo’s response to the THAAD debate and we might a filibuster to stop it,” quoting Jeong Se-hyun, 『Yonhap News Agency』, 16 August 2016, [in Korean]; “韓前高官：部署“薩德”是樸槿惠政府外交政策的失敗,” 『新華社』, 2016. 8. 2., [in Chinese]; “韓媒:樸槿惠對華外交全面失敗 因薩德獨斷專行,” 『環球時報』, 19 August 2016 [in Chinese] and other references.
China highlighted the image that opposition to the THAAD deployment is gaining widespread support not only in China but also in South Korea by citing these arguments against the THAAD deployment through various media outlets including the Internet. With a growing antipathy between the Korean and Chinese public in the aftermath of the public opinion warfare over the THAAD deployment, South Korean public opinion became more riven with the issue.
3. Psychological Warfare
In addition to a series of attempts aimed at shaping public opinion in its favor, China retaliated against South Korea across economic, social, and cultural sectors using official and unofficial sanctions. Beijing’s calculus was that public support for THAAD deployment in Korea would gradually wane once its retaliatory measures start to bite Korea across a broad range of sectors. From China’s standpoint, an effective operation of psychological warfare would pressure the Korean government into reversing the THAAD decision by inciting fear among the South Korean public about the economic fallout of China’s retaliation. While China never officially admitted its existence, the most well-known psychological warfare campaign launched by China against Korea is “A Chinese ban on Korean contents (限韓令),” which restricted or prohibited Chinese purchases of and investments in Korean companies and industries that are highly dependent on China. Some of the measures were indicative of government involvement, such as the ban on local travel agencies’ sales of group tours,18) chartering flights, and cruise trips that send tourists to Korea. Major television networks like Anhui Satellite TV and Hunan Television stopped airing Korean dramas and films, and Korean pop artists’ concerts were canceled. Furthermore, China toughened customs clearance procedures for South Korean food products and cosmetics and began an anti-dumping investigation on imports of chemical products from Korea. Korean companies operating in China also faced sudden tax investigations and fire safety inspections, with Lotte Group bearing the biggest brunt; the retailer eventually pulled out of China in August 2022 after facing a slew of setbacks, including consumer boycotts, local suppliers’ refusal to deliver products, Chinese authorities’ confiscation of generators and power transformers from Lotte Mart stores, and major store closures. Lotte has allegedly become the primary target of Beijing’s campaign against South Korean companies after the agreement on the land swap deal with the Ministry of National Defense for the THAAD system. Chinese protesters took to the streets to lash out against the Korean government’s decision, and angered consumers boycotted South Korean products and damaged Korean stores operating in China. After Lotte announced its site provision, Lotte Mart hypermarkets and Lotte department stores had to bear the brunt of China’s THAAD-related ire and public opinion warfare campaigns launched by Chinese consumers. It is widely viewed that the Chinese government gave its tacit approval to these consumer boycotts and protests,19) and a research by Swedish analysts corroborates this view.
18) “Korean Tourism Industry Braces for China’s Partial Ban on Group Tours to Korea.” News 1, December 20, 2017. https://www.news1.kr/articles/?3185468 [in Korean]; “China National Tourism Administration Refuses to Issue Departure Permits to Travel Agencies in Beijing and Shandong Sending Tourists to Korea.” Herald Corporation, December 20, 2017. http://mbiz.heraldcorp.com/view.php?ud=20171220000303. [in Korean]
19) Chung Jin-Young, “China’s THAAD Retaliation and the Future of Korea-China Relations,” Current Issues & Policies (April 2017), p.14. [in Korean]
According to this research, 71 out of 91 consumer boycotts in China since 2008 were politically motivated; they were linked to accusations of China’s violation of sovereignty and alleged human rights violations in Hong Kong and Xinjiang or triggered by diplomatic frictions with other countries. 25 out of those boycotts were backed by Chinese authorities or by organizations with ties to the government. Six boycotts targeted South Korean companies, and four of them were THAAD-related.20) The four companies affected were Hyundai Motor, Kia Motors, Amore Pacific, and Lotte, and 23 of Lotte’s supermarket stores had been shut after fire safety inspections, which were later found to be a government-led clampdown.21) Beijing’s campaign against South Korea specifically targeted sectors that are an integral part of people’s daily lives, such as tourism, entertainment, and consumer goods industries. Through these measures, perceived to have been taken in retaliation for South Korea’s THAAD-related decision, Beijing successfully flaunted its growing influence and economic might. Koreans during this period grew deeply concerned about the negative impact of China on the Korean economy, but numbers suggested otherwise. In fact, Korea’s trade with China trended upward from 2016 to 2018 as shown in Figure 1. Given the data, it is reasonable to assume that the Chinese clampdown on Korean firms was more likely designed to cause anxiety and erode social cohesion in Korea than to inflict substantial damage on the Korean economy. Korea-China Trade Volume (2010-2022) Source: Korea International Trade Association (KITA) Further, China took diplomatic actions to protest against the deployment of THAAD on Korean soil. Beijing canceled or postponed a series of officials meetings, including the then-governor of Jeollanam-do province Lee Nak-yeon’s planned visit to Sichuan, Chongqing, and Shanxi.22)
20) JYP and Samsung were also targeted in 2016 and 2019 respectively, and their stance on Hong Kong and Taiwan Issues was found to be the reason behind Chinese coercive actions targeting the two companies.
21) Hillevi Parup & Viking Bohman, “Purchasing with the Party: Chinese customer boycotts of foreign companies, 2008-2021,” Swedish National China Centre Report (July 11, 2022). https://kinacentrum.se/en/publications/chinese-consumer-boycotts-of-foreign-companies.
22) “Governor Lee Nak-yeon’s Visit to China Postponed Amid Controversy over THAAD.” KBS, August 29, 2016. http://news.kbs.co.kr/news/view.do?ncd=3336269&ref=A (accessed April 12, 2021). [in Korean]
Governor Lee was set to meet with his counterparts in the three provinces, but China called off or postponed the meetings without prior consultation. China has never admitted that it had retaliatory intentions with the cancellations, but given that Chinese local municipalities operate under strict control and supervision by the central government, it is widely viewed that the local governments were pressured into making those decisions that had been perceived as “diplomatically inappropriate” by the Korean side. On top of that, remarks made by high-profile Chinese officials and newspaper commentaries implied state-led efforts to pressure Seoul on the THAAD issue. When U.S. Defense Secretary Mark Esper said he was “in favor of placing ground-launched, intermediate-range missiles in Asia relatively soon” during his trip to Asia, China’s Global Times warned that Korea and Japan “should not fall victim to U.S. policies pressuring Asia,” and the consequences for the two nations could be far greater than those of Seoul’s THAAD installation. Fu Cong, director general of the arms control department at China’s foreign ministry, explicitly threatened countermeasures following Esper’s comment, saying Beijing “will not stand idly by” and “if the U.S. deploys missiles in this part of the world, at the doorstep of China, China will be forced to take countermeasures.” He specifically mentioned Japan, South Korea, and Australia, warning U.S. missile deployment would not serve their national security interests.
4. Legal Warfare (Lawfare)
China’s tacit consent to sanctions was arguably the most striking feature of Beijing’s response to Seoul’s THAAD decision. As stated above, China encouraged or turned a blind eye to Chinese consumers’ boycotts of Korean companies and an array of regulations targeting Korean firms to hurt the Korean economy and psychologically intimidate the Korean people. Tacit approval is a tactic China has often relied upon since the onset of the country’s explosive economic growth, which features informal tools that are difficult to call out or challenge at the World Trade Organization (WTO). Chinese sanctions targeted a range of countries for political ends, which include Beijing’s cancellation of Airbus jet orders following French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s announcement of his meeting with the Dalai Lama; boycotts of Japanese products amid territorial disputes over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands; customs delays following the territorial disputes in the West Philippine Sea between China and the Philippines; and China’s boycott of U.S. goods amid U.S.-China trade disputes. This playbook has taken concrete shape since President Xi Jinping took power (especially after his second term), and suggests a clear shift in Chinese response to diplomatic frictions. In the past, China had articulated opposition and displeasure to pressure its opponents, but in recent years, Beijing has become fixated on creating a legal basis for its coercive actions. The country started delaying customs clearance by imposing stricter customs checks and began introducing stricter requirements and procedures for Chinese visa applications to target countries that offend Beijing. Despite a string of actions taken by China to target countries that have supposedly offended it, when it comes to the THAAD dispute, the country has yet to come up with clear regulations that justify the narratives or institutionalize a solution. China, notably, has made efforts to create a legal basis for addressing the controversy over THAAD. In an effort to improve strained ties with China, the Moon Jae-in administration had allegedly delivered to China a negotiated solution to the impasse in October 2017, which is the so-called “three noes” by South Korea - no additional deployment of THAAD batteries, no South Korean integration into a U.S. led regional missile defense system, and no trilateral alliance with the United States and Japan. On October 31, 2017, Nam Gwan-pyo, second deputy director of South Korea’s Office of National Security, and Kong Xuanyou, China’s deputy foreign minister, announced a joint statement titled the “Outcome of Consultations between the ROK and China on Improvement in the Bilateral Relations” and took note of China’s security concerns related to the deployment of MD systems, additional installment of THAAD on Korean soil, and Korea-U.S.-Japan military cooperation. The statement also notes that Korea reinstated its public stance on the matter regarding THAAD.23) And three months later, Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi met with South Korean Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-wha in Beijing and said he believes there was “a partial agreement between the two ministers on finding a step-by-step resolution of the conflict over the THAAD deployment.” Wang Yi also told his South Korean counterpart that Beijing hopes Seoul would “appropriately handle” their dispute over the THAAD deployment.24) In 2022, Beijing added “one limit” - what it claims to be South Korea’s pledge to limit THAAD operation – to the “three noes” list, claiming that the “three noes and one limit” is a formal promise that Seoul should commit to.25)
23) Northeast Asia Division II at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, “Outcome of Consultations between the ROK and China on Improvement in the Bilateral Relations,” October 31, 2017, https://www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_4080/view.do?seq=367200. [in Korean]
24) The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, “Press Briefing by Spokesperson and Deputy Minister for Public Relations Noh Kyu-duk,” November 23, 2017, https://www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_4078/view.do?seq=367554 [in Korean]; Northeast Asia Division II at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, “Outcome of Korea-China Foreign Ministers’ Meeting,” November 22, 2017, https://www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/ m_4080/view.do?seq=367533. [in Korean]
25) “THAAD Issue Remains a Sour Spot in Korea-China Relations.” Yonhap News Agency, September 17, 2022. https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20220917025300083?input=1195m. [in Korean]
As China seeks to present the “three nos and one limit” as a fait accompli and a legally binding agreement, Korea should carefully monitor the developments going forward and explore ways to deal with Chinese attempts to justify their actions. IV. Navigating the Gray Zone: Considerations for the Targets of Operations As stated above, the gray zone is a murky area consisting of a set of activities that are neither a full-on conflict nor an outright war. Since gray zone conflicts are purposefully designed to side-step direct military conflict, targeted actors often find it difficult to respond with military action. But this does not mean that gray zone conflicts remain in the realm of “low politics” that are entirely separable from the concept of conventional warfare. As is evident in Russia, a country’s gray zone operation could quickly morph into an armed attack, because years of low-intensity conflicts increase the likelihood of a major clash. And the increasing use of military tools in today’s gray zone conflicts also increases the risk of countries crossing the threshold of an armed attack; the Russian invasion of Ukraine, China’s quasi-military action against Japan amid territorial disputes, and China’s biggest-ever military exercises in the seas around Taiwan following Nancy Pelosi’s visit all constitute an example of coercive actions that could draw countries closer to the threshold of war or even lead them to cross it. Although the intensity of provocation is under control in many cases, gray zone activities involving military forms could morph into a major military clash depending on the target’s response. For this reason, target countries of gray zone conflicts tend to approach the issue with a long-term posture and focus on addressing their vulnerabilities that could be easily exploited by the aggressors. A country facing gray zone operation by an adversary could respond in two ways: a preemptive response and a post-crisis response. A preemptive response is shaping an environment favorable for the target state in areas that are vulnerable to grey zone aggression. But from a head of state’s vantage point, the political costs associated with taking preemptive action are often too steep due to unclear attribution in the gray zone. And the target country could face more serious forms of gray zone aggression if its preemptive response backfires and prompts the adversary to take a more aggressive posture. That said, putting a preemptive response off the table could mean completely losing out on the chances to evade a major clash. Faced with such a dilemma, the leader of the target state should make prudent decisions that serve his or her country’s interests. The target state must contemplate a post-crisis response once it finds itself engaged in a gray zone conflict. A post-crisis response includes using economic and political coercion and launching military/quasi-military activities against the adversary.
The level of response varies from (i) making a concession; (ii) taking a whole-of-government response; (iii) forging an alliance with a hegemon; to (iv) mobilizing global public opinion against the adversary. The problem with this approach is that it risks provoking the aggressor and thus triggering inadvertent escalation. But at the same time, if the target country shows no signs of hitting back, the adversary could be further tempted to launch additional provocations. This is another sharp dilemma facing the target country alongside the conundrum associated with taking preemptive measures. In the gray zone, uncertainty is particularly an acute challenge, and targeted countries are often forced to make tough decisions in the face of gray zone operations tailored toward their vulnerabilities. More often than not, democracies are more vulnerable to gray-zone activities than autocracies. Democratic nations frequently experience regime change and policy shifts, and policymakers are highly sensitive to public opinion.
For this reason, decision-makers in democracies find it hard to ensure a high level of policy continuity to face down gray zone threats. Moreover, democracies do not control information in the news, online, and on social media, so people are more likely to be exposed to psychological operations designed to induce or reinforce attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives. The Internet,now an inseparable part of people’s lives, further exposes individuals in democratic nations to fake news, misinformation, and disinformation as well as psychological warfare in cyberspace and the information domain.
To counter psychological warfare, policymakers in a democratic nation have to persuade the public of the importance of countering psychological warfare even if it means implementing a time-consuming and costly policy with no guarantee of success. Left unchecked, psychological operations will spread falsehoods online and affect public opinion in the target country, but the openness of democracies like South Korea may create obstacles in fighting a battle in the gray zone.
Ⅴ. Conclusion
China’s rapid economic growth has been the driver of its rise as a potential superpower in the 21st century, and the country has been using its expanding influence to weaken American hegemony and undermine the credibility of U.S. deterrence capabilities. Gray zone activities were among many tactics China has employed to meet its strategic objectives, and Beijing’s gray zone operations could be combined with other military or non-military instruments, or be launched to tilt the balance in its favor prior to an armed conflict. In general, gray zone activities remain below key escalatory thresholds with carefully designed operations, so they are less likely to result in an overt military confrontation or an invasion. Russia, however, chose to escalate the gray zone conflicts in Ukraine that culminated with its annexation of Crimea into a full-scale invasion, ringing alarm bells for potential targets of China’s gray zone campaigns. To prevent Chinese operations in the gray zone from taking escalation pathways, it is critical that target countries have a clear-eyed view of Chinese intentions and identify potential risks to prepare for all possible scenarios. Owing to its technological advancements in artificial intelligence, cyber, and security domains, China is viewed as a more formidable opponent than Russia. The country is strongly committed to developing more advanced technologies, and the Chinese leadership does not shy away from wielding the country’s technological prowess for political gains. China already has the world’s largest surveillance network, with highly advanced surveillance cameras, facial recognition, and phone-tracking technologies used to collect vast amounts of personal data. Chinese authorities have little regard for ethical or data privacy concerns, which is a key driver behind the country’s hefty investments in the development of surveillance technologies. And with the “14th Five-Year Plan and Long-Term Objectives for 2035” announced at the 2021 Two Sessions, the country aims to accelerate digital transition across all sectors with a primary focus on data, network, and AI, also known as “D·N·A” technologies.
With China poised to become a dominant player in the cyber domain, countries targeted by China should err on the side of caution to prepare for possible gray zone operations enabled by the development of emerging technologies. While it is hard to quantify the damages caused by China’s gray zone activities, gray zone tactics serve Chinese interests by exerting influence on people’s reasoning and sowing chaos in target countries that are often asymmetrically trade dependent on Beijing. Particularly vulnerable are the countries sharing land and maritime borders with China. In general, gray zone tactics are less likely to pose imminent threats, but false narratives deliberately intended to mislead regional or international audiences could help the aggressor outmaneuver its targets in the gray zone.
Therefore, policymakers facing gray zone threats should keep a close eye on provocations that appear to fall below the threshold of an armed conflict, because gray zone operations, regardless of their scope and intensity, could quickly tilt the balance of power in favor of the aggressor
